Michigan Law Review
Volume 70

Issue 5

1972

Adjustment to Hardship Caused by Imports: The New Decisions
of the Tariff Commission and the Need for Legislative
Clarification
Carl H. Fulda
University of Texas

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Carl H. Fulda, Adjustment to Hardship Caused by Imports: The New Decisions of the Tariff Commission
and the Need for Legislative Clarification, 70 MICH. L. REV. 791 (1972).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol70/iss5/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

ADJUSTMENT TO HARDSHIP CAUSED BY
IMPORTS: THE NEW DECISIONS OF THE
TARIFF COMMISSION AND THE NEED
FOR LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION
Carl H. Fulda*
I.

GATT

AND THE

ESCAPE CLAUSE

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,1 known as GATT,
embodies the commitments of its contracting parties, now numbering eighty countries,2 to enter "into reciprocal and mutual advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce." 8
The GATT provision that concerns us here is article XIX, which
permits "Emergency Action on Import of Particular Products." Obviously, an international arrangement by which tariffs have been
reduced in successive stages over the years is bound to create some
hardships for importing countries. Accordingly, article XIX, paragraph l(a) provides:

T

HE

If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this agreement,
including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the
territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic. producers in that territory of like or directly competitive
products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to
prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole
or in part or to ·withdraw or modify the concession.
The contracting party whose interest as exporter of the product concerned is affected by such "escape clause" action may suspend "substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations."4 Language
• Hugh Lamar Stone Professor of Law, University of Texas. J.U.D. 1931, University
of Freiburg; LL.B. 1938, Yale University.-Ed.
1. 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A3 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T .S. 194. For recent studies
see K. DAM, THE GATT; LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970);
J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).
2, GATT Press Release No. 1091 (1971). Several other countries (most of them in
Africa) apply the General Agreement on a de facto basis. GATT, 17th Supp. BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELEcrED DOCUMENTS, at VII (1970) [hereinafter BISD].
3. GATT, Preamble.
4. GATT, art. XIX, para. 3(a).
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similar in effect to the section of article XIX quoted above was incorporated by Congress into section 7 of the Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951,6 which remained in effect until 1962.0
II.

THE TRADE EXPANSION

Ac:r:

OF

1962

The requirements for relief under the escape clause were made
more severe by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.7 Upon request by
the President, resolution by the congressional committees having
jurisdiction over trade matters, its own motion, or petition by a trade
association, firm, or union, the Tariff Commission shall
make an investigation to determine whether, as a result in major
part of concessions granted under trade agreements, an article is being
imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to
cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry
producing an article which is like or directly competitive with the
imported article.s
... Increased imports shall be considered to cause, or threaten
to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry concerned when the
Tariff Commission finds that such increased imports have been the
major factor in causing, or threatening to cause, such injury.0

This language has been held to establish four prerequisites for
an affirmative finding with respect to an industry, on the basis of
which the President "may proclaim such increase in, or imposition
of~ any duty or other import restriction on the article causing or
threatening to cause serious injury to such industry as he determines
to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury to such industry.''10 These prerequisites are
(I) Imports of a like or competitive article produced by the
domestic industry must be increasing;
(2) The increased imports must be in major part the result of
trade agreement concessions;
(3) The domestic industry producing the like or competitive
article must be suffering serious injury or be threatened with serious
injury; and
5. Ch. 141, § 7, 65 Stat. 72, repealed by Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-794, 76 Stat. 872.
6. See Metzger, The Escape Clause and Adjustment Assistance: Proposals and As•
sessments, 2 LAw & POLICY IN INTL. Bus. 352, 357-58 (1970).
7 •. A~ of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, '76 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991
(1970).
8. 19 U.S.C. § 190l(b)(l) (1970).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 190l(b)(3) (1970).
10. 19 U.S.C. § I98l(a)(l) (1970).
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(4) The increased imports must be the major factor in causing or
threatening to cause serious injury.11

This statute differs from the prior American law and from article
XIX of GATT in two respects. First, to obtain tariff adjustments it
is now necessary to show that increased imports were caused in major
part by concessions under trade agreements. Prior to 1962 the Tariff
Commission had to "determine whether any product upon which a
concession [had] been granted under a trade agreement [was], as a
result, in whole or in part, of the duty or other customs treatment
reflecting such concessions, being imported into the United States in
such increased quantities ... as to cause or threaten serious injury
to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products.''12 Under this pre-1962 language, it was easy to find that tariff
concessions were in part the cause of increased imports. Indeed, the
Tariff Commission seemed to have assumed without discussion that
this causal relationship was present in every case.13 Second, under the
present law the concession-generated imports must be the major
factor of actual or threatened serious injury to the industry. Prior
to 1962 increased imports were to "be considered as the cause or
threat of serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or
directly competitive products when the Commission finds that such
increased imports have contributed substantially toward causing or
threatening to cause serious injury to such industry." 14 Thus the
11. See, e.g., Nonrubber Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 359, at 6 Gan. 1971)
(views of Commissioners Clubb and Moore). The same enumeration is found in numerous other Commission reports explaining the statutory requirements.
12. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, ch. 141, § 7(a), 65 Stat. 74 (emphasis
added). The words "in whole or in part" seem in practical result identical with art.
XIX, para. l(a) of GA'IT, which cites as two causes for increased imports "unforeseen
developments" and "tariff concessions."
13. See, e.g., Groundfish Fillets, Tariff Commn. Report No. 25, at 16 (May 1954):
"[I]t is manifest that with a continuation of the present tariff treatment imports •••
will continue to capture an increasing share • • • ." The duty under the Tariff Act of
1930 of 2-1/2¢ per pound bad been reduced in 1938 to 1-7/8¢ on an annual tariff quota.
There was no discussion whether the imports bad been the result of the reduction in
duty. Accord, Ferrocerium (Lighter Flints) and All Other Cerium Alloys, Tariff Commn.
Report No. 41 (Dec. 1955), in which "findings" that as a result of a 50% reduction in
the 1930 tariff, imports had increased were not supported by any discussion. Concerning
this attitude of the Commission, H.R. REP. No. 1761, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958),
stated:
The Committee considered the Tariff Commission's explanation of its understanding as to the necessary causal relationship, in escape clause cases, between
the tariff concession in question and the increased imports. It agreed that the
Commission is warranted in considering that, when increased imports of a product
on which a concession has been granted cause serious injury, there is sufficient evidence that the level of the existing duty reflecting the concession contributes, in
part, at least, to such increased imports.
14. Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, § 6, 69 Stat. 166 (1955) (emphasis added).

794

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, '10:'191

1962 Act established two causation requirements with a stiffer burden
of proof for the industry seeking tariff relief.
But these were not the only changes in 1962. In addition to tariff
adjustment for an industry, two new remedies were created. Firms
and groups of workers were authorized to petition for adjustment
assistance. To qualify for such individual relief the petitioners have
to meet the same four prerequisites set forth above for tariff relief. 16
Moreover, the remedies provided for tariff adjustment and firm and
worker adjustment may be combined: When the President receives
a recommendation for tariff adjustment, he may also certify the firms
and workers of such industry for individual adjustments or choose
one or the other of these remedies.16
The substantive benefits of individual adjustment assistance are
set forth in the statute in some detail.17 They consist of technical,
financial, and tax assistance for firms18 and of trade readjustment and
relocation allowances and training programs for workers. 10 The
Secretaries of Commerce and Labor, respectively, are charged with
administration and supervision,20
The two individual remedies were added because it was felt that
tariff adjustment alone was insufficient to protect American firms
and workers. The Committee on Ways and Means, in reporting the
bill that became the Trade Expansion Act, explained:
Under current law no relief whatsoever is available to firms and
workers injured by imports unless their injury is shared by a large
part of their industry. Furthermore the granting of tariff adjustment
in particular cases necessarily has an impact on our total foreign
economic policy. It necessitates the granting of tariff compensation
15. 19 U.S.C. § 190l(c)(l)·(3) (1970) basically provides that firms and workers must
show that "as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements
••• an article like or directly competitive with an article produced by the firm" or
"by such workers' firm, or an appropriate subdivision thereof," "is being imported
••• in such increased quantities as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to
such firm" or "unemployment or underemployment of a significant number • • • of the
workers of such firm or subdivision." In both types of petitions it must be shown that
the increased imports "have been the major factor in causing, or threatening to cause,
such injury or unemployment or underemployment." Tariff Commission regulations
with respect to the filing of petitions by industries, firms, and workers are found in
19 C.F.R. pt. 206 (1971).
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (1970).
17. For a thorough analysis of "the substance of current adjustment assistance
benefits" and "proposals for improvement under an expanded program," see Metzger,
supra note 6, at 389-400.
18. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1911-20 (1970). See 15 C.F.R. §§ 610.1-.42 (1971).
19. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1931-78 (1970). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 90.1-91.28 (1971},
20. This authority is found in various parts of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1902-78 (1970).
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to our trading partners on other products in order to counterbalance
whatever U.S. Tariffs are raised under the escape clause.21
Under this view relief to firms and workers is always a good thing,
while upsetting tariff concessions and risking retaliation is something
which should be reserved for grave situations only. This would be
a plausible policy, but if Congress had wished to adopt it, it would
surely have used different language in expressing the eligibility requirements for individual as distinguished from industry assistance.
Since it used the same language, it is clear that the requirements
for adjustment assistance to industries, firms, and workers were intended to be identical.22

III.

THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS UNDER THE

1962 Am::

No RELIEF FOR .ANYoNE

From the time of the enactment of the Trade Expansion Act
through October 1969, no petitions for tariff adjustment or for adjustment assistance to firms or workers were granted. During that
period there were thirteen petitions by industries,23 eight petitions
by :firms,24 and six petitions by workers.25 Thus "we have played
21. H.R. REP. No. 1818 (Trade Expansion Act of 1962), 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1962). See Metzger, supra note 6, at 379.
22. Professor Metzger, while chairman of the Tariff Commission, pointed out that
the House Report (supra note 21, at 23) stated that the test for adjustment assistance to
firms "is substantially the same" as that for tariff adjustments; he suggested that this
similarity is not synonymous with identical, and, therefore, in borderline cases, the
causation criterion should be relaxed in adjustment assistance cases. Supplementary
statement of Chairman Metzger, Barbers' Chairs, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 228, at 19-20
(Jan. 1968) (emphasis added). This suggestion has not been accepted by other members
of the Commission. Professor Metzger conceded that his approach was not very precise and permitted "very limited leeway." Id. at 20.
23. Hatter's Fur, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 82 (April 1963); Household China Tableware, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 84 (April 1963); Earthenware Table & Kitchen Articles,
Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 86 (April 1963); Softwood Lumber, Tariff Commn. Puhl:
No. 79 (Feb. 1963); Whisky, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 89 (April 1963); Watches, Tariff
Commn. Pub!. No. 142 (Oct. 1964); Umbrellas, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 136 (Sept.
1964); Ice Skates, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 149 (Feb. 1965); Mushrooms, Tariff Commn.
Pub!. No. 148 (Jan. 1965); Eyeglass Frames, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 219 (Oct, 1967);
Barbers' Chairs, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 228 (Jan. 1968); Broomcorn, Tariff Commn.
Pub!. No. 238 (March 1968); Canned Sardines, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 291 CTuly
1969).
24. Barbers' Chairs, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 229 CTan, 1968); Barbers' Chairs,
Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 230 (Jan. 1968); Household China Tableware, Tariff Commn.
Pub!. No. 85 (April 1963); Crude Petroleum, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 134 (Aug. 1964);
Plywood Door Skins, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 162 (Oct. 1965) (Commission equally
divided); Sodium Gluconate, Technical, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 101 (July 1963);
Ceramic Mosaic Tile, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 85 (April 1963); National Tile & Mfg.
Co., Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 145 (Dec. 1964) (Commission equally divided).
25. Unmanufactured Zinc, Tariff Commn. Publ •. No. 81 (March 1963); Ceramic Mo-
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false" with the expectations of the Congress that enacted the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 and particularly of those who relied on the
promise of individual relief held out in that Act. 26
This disappointment of expectations was attn1mtable to the causation requirements of the 1962 Act, which, as explained above, required a finding that the increase of imports was due in major part
to tariff concession and that such increases were the major factor in
causing serious injury to industries and firms and in causing workers' unemployment. The first of the causation requirements-increase of imports due to concessions-was particularly troublesome.
For instance, in its 1963 escape-clause investigation in Softwoocl
Lumber,27 the Commission said:
[M]aximum stimulation of imports attributable to a reduction in
duty generally occurs directly or shortly after the reduced rates come
into effect. The interval during which the reduction in duty operates
to cause imports to continue rising varies with the commodity and
attendant circumstances. In the instant case, some of the trade agreement reductions in duty were made as far back as 1936, and none
were made more recently than 1948. The duty reductions made on
softwood lumber so long ago can no longer be more than a negligible cause of lumber being imported in increased quantities ....2s

Consequently, the Commission did not have to reach the issue
whether there was serious injury caused in major part by the increased imports.29
In disposing of petitions for adjustment assistance by firms and
workers, the Commission also made negative findings on both causation requirements. 30 In one case brought by a firm, two Commissioners who voted against relief stated that "the major factor" meant
"the one that dominates the overall result," not merely the most
saic Tile, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 115 (Nov. 1963); Transistor Radios, Tariff Commn.
Publ. No. 91 (May 1963); Iron Ore, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 96 Ouly 1963); Cotton
Sheeting Workers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 100 Ouly 1963); Men's Leather Footwear,
Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 232 (March 1968).
26. Statement of W. Wirtz, former Secretary of Labor, Hearings on Foreign Trade
and Tariff Proposals Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 90th Cong., 2d Scss. 38
(1968).
27. Softwood Lumber, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 79 (Feb. 1963).
28. Id. at 10. Accord, Earthenware Table &: Kitchen Articles, Tariff Commn. Pub].
No. 86, at 5 (April 1963); Broomcorn, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 238, at 3-4, 7 (March
1968).
29. Softwood Lumber, supra note 27, at 21. For discussion of other cases, see Banner,
"In Major-Part"-The New Causation Problem in the Trade-Agreements Program, 44
TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1331, 1336-43 (1966).
30. The decisions on firms' and workers' petitions are reviewed in Banner, supra
note 29, at 1345-56.
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important in a series of factors. 31 In a workers' case, the Commission
rejected the argument that more liberal standards than thbse applicable to industry or firm investigations should be applied and
denied the petition on the ground that eight years had elapsed since
the last tariff concession.32 Although these reductions maintained
imports "at a higher level than would presumably have prevailed
otherwise, ... the major stimuli to increased imports in recent years
are to be found primarily in factors other than the trade-agreement
concessions. " 33
IV.

THE FIRST DECISIONS BREAKING NEW GROUND

In November 1969 the Commission, with one dissent, granted
for the first time three workers' petitions for adjustment assistance.
The first, Buttweld Pipe, 34 involved the workers at a plant of the
Armco Steel Corporation, whose multimillion dollar production
complex capable of producing large quantities of welded pipe had
been shut down. Imports had increased during the past ten years.
The statutory duty rate of $15 per ton prevailing in 193035 had been
cut in half in 1948 and further reduced to $6 in 1958. Commissioners
Sutton, Thunberg, and Newsom explained that imports could compete with domestic products only if they were priced lower in order
to compensate the buyer for longer delivery times, limited services,
and the advance planning necessary for dealing with foreign suppliers.86 The average landed value of imports during the five years
preceding the shutdmvn was estimated to be from 9% to 19% lower
than the average value of domestic shipments. Without the reduction
of $9 in import duties, i.e., the total reductions below the 1930 rate,
import values would have been in the range of 4% to 13% below
the average domestic values. Hence the increased imports had been
stimulated in major part by the price advantage resulting from tariff
concessions under GATT and the loss of 350 jobs was the result of
these imports.87 It should be noted that the largest concession was
81. National Tile 8: Mfg. Co., Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 145, at 7 (Dec. 1964).
82. Cotton Sheeting Workers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 100 CTuly 1968).
33. Id. at 7. The other factors were disparities between the costs of foreign and

domestic fabricators and the price-support program of the Department of Agriculture.
34. :Buttweld Pipe, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 297 (Nov. 1969).
35. The 1930 statutory duty was one of the rates established by the Tariff Act of
1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590. That Act, popularly known as the Smoot-Hawley Act, was the
high-water mark of American protectionism. See C. FULDA&: W. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND
l\{ATERIAU! ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 179 (1970).
36. Buttweld Pipe, supra note 34, at 5.
37. Id. at 4-5.
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granted 21 years, and the latest, a relatively small one, 11 years prior
to the filing of the petition.
A second opinion in the case by Commissioners Thunberg, Clubb,
and Moore was even more explicit. It set forth the four requirements
for relief under the statute, the large increase in imports from 1963
to 1968,88 and then quoted the House and Senate Reports that explained the phrase "as a result of concessions granted under trade
agreements" as meaning "the aggregate reduction which has been
arrived at by means of a trade agreement or trade agreements
(whether entered into under . . . this bill or under Section 350 of
the Tariff Act of 1930)."39 Accordingly, Commissioners Thunberg,
Clubb, and Moore proclaimed the necessity to consider
the total reductions made since the beginning of the trade agreements program, not just the most recent reduction ...• In determining whether the increased imports are a result "in major part" of
the aggregate of concessions granted since 1934, we need ask ourselves
only whether, but for the concessions, would imports be substantially at their present leveI.40

Answering this question in the negative, the three Commissioners
emphasized that price was "the single most significant factor" in this
market and that "about two-thirds of the importers' price advantage
is occasioned by the trade agreements concessions."41
The "but for" test was also held applicable to the second causation requirement. The mill was said to be struggling with "inflation
and other factors" that caused its cost to rise while "import competition from countries with a lesser rate of inflation tended to keep
the price of its products down." Thus a mill which was "marginal
even under normal circumstances became submarginal because of
its inability to meet the price competition from imported pipe."
Hence "but for the concession-generated increased imports this plant
would probably have been able to stay in business."42
38. Id. at 7-8.
39. H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1962); S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 20 (1962), quoted in Buttweld Pipe, supra note 34, at 8-9 n.4.
40. Buttweld Pipe, supra note 34, at 9-10 (emphasis added). Nineteen thirty-four
was the year of the enactment of the first Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, Act of
June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943. This Act granted authority to the President "to
enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments ••• [and] to proclaim
such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions ••• as are required
or appropriate to carry out any foreign trade agreement that the President has entered
into hereunder." There was a 50% limitation, upward or downward, on modifications
of existing duties, and this limitation was continued in all subsequent statutes. See
19 U.S.C. § 182l(b) (1970).
41. Buttweld Pipe, supra note 34, at 10-11.
42, Id. at 12-13.
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In Transmission Towers and Parts,43 decided simultaneously with
Buttweld Pipe, the Commission, again by votes of five to one, granted
petitions by workers of the United States Steel Corporation's Pittsburgh and Los Angeles plants. The statutory rate of 20% had been
lowered to 7.5% by reductions in 1935, 1948, and 1951 with a further
reduction of 0.5% taking effect on January I, 1968-a total reduction of 65%.44 The price advantage of imported towers was $44 per
ton or more.45 This was more than twice the differential permitted
by regulations under the Buy American Act for purchase of foreignmade materials by federal agencies.46 Accordingly, the majority concluded that but for the duty reductions imports would not have increased "in recent years" 47 and that unemployment would not have
occurred but for the increased imports.48
Commissioner Leonard dissented in both the Buttweld Pipe and
Transmission Towers cases.49 He rejected the "but for" test as irreconcilable ·with the statutory language of "in major part," which was designed to make relief available "only in exceptional circumstances."
Only Congress could liberalize these requirements.50 Specifically,
he pointed out in Buttweld Pipe that the plant had been built more
than nvo years after the last tariff reduction took effect; therefore,
the employer could not have been concerned about low tariffs. Moreover, the ratio of imports to domestic production remained steady
except in 1968 with domestic production increasing along with imports. An extraordinary increase in imports in 1968 was due to the
imminence of a strike in the steel industry that prompted customers
to increase their inventories.51 In Transmission Towers, Commissioner Leonard noted that there was no substantial connection between the duty reductions, which, in practical effect, ended in 1951
and the imports, which began to pick up fifteen years Iater.112
43. Transmission Towers & Parts, Tariff Com.nm. Publ. No. 298 (Nov. 1969) [hereinafter Transmission Towers I]. Accord, Transmission Towers & Parts, Tariff Commn.
Publ. No. 316 (March 1970) (production at a modern plant had ceased because of loss
of federal agency contracts to cheaper foreign suppliers).
44. See Transmission Towers I, supra note 43, at II.
45. Id. at 4.
46. See id. at 4. Under the Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § IO(a)-(d) (1970), American
materials are required for public use unless the head of the federal agency concerned
determines that acquisition of American materials is "inconsistent with the public interest, or the cost ••• unreasonable." See 41 C.F.R. § 1-6.104-4 (1971).
47. Transmission Towers I, supra note 43, at IO. No precise figures of increased
imports were given.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Butl:lveld Pipe, supra note 34, at 16; Transmission Towers I, supra note 43, at 15.
50. Transmission Towers I, supra note 43, at 18.
51. Butl:lveld Pipe, supra note 34, at 17-18.
52. Transmission Towers I, supra note 43, at 22.
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These decisions, coming after seven years of hopeless efforts, produced a veritable flood of new petitions, particularly by workers.
Indeed, in 1970 and 1971, the Commission decided 110 workers'
petitions, twenty-seven firm petitions (by relatively small enterprises),
and eight industry petitions. Fourteen of the workers' petitions and
five of the firm petitions were granted. The Commission was equally
divided in twenty-five workers' cases; in all of these the President
broke the tie vote and directed that assistance be granted.08 With
respect to firm petitions, the Commission was equally divided in seven
cases: in all except one, decided in November 1971, the President has
certified the firms as eligible. In the escape clause investigations, a
majority of the Commission granted relief in one case; the Commission was equally divided in three cases and in two of these the
President broke the tie vote. We must, then, try to analyze these
decisions for the purpose of obtaining a comprehensive picture of
the present state of the case law.
V.

DECISIONS OF THE TARIFF COMMISSION SUBSEQUENT
TO BUTIWELD PIPE AND TRANSMISSION TOWERS

The novelty of the Buttweld Pipe and Transmission Towers
cases consists of the adoption of the "but for" test for measuring
causation. This is a shorthand expression for a rather complicated
problem: Is it _necessary in order to find causation that increases
in imports occur immediately or within a short time after tariff reductions take effect? Or is the length of the time interval between
tariff reductions and increased imports irrelevant? If the interval is
irrelevant, is it sufficient to show that maintenance of the statutory
rate prevailing in 1930 would have prevented the present growth
of imports? Could there still be reasons other than tariff concessions
or increases in concession-generated imports that would destroy both
causation requirements? Finally, what type of relief, if any, should
53. The President's authority to break a tie vote, never exercised by Presidents Ken•
nedy and Johnson, is based on § 330(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1330(d)
(1970), which applies to "any case calling for findings of the Commission in connection
with any authority conferred upon the President by law to make changes in import
restrictions ••••" A petition for tariff adjustment under the escape clause obviously
presents such a case. Petitions for adjustment assistance by firms and workers, however,
do not lead to "changes in import restrictions." Hence, Commissioners Sutton, Leonard,
and Newsom have contended that the "tie vote" provision does not apply in such cases.
Women's &: Misses' Dress Shoes with Leather, Vinyl or Fabric Uppers, Tariff Commn.
Puhl. No. 323, at 7-10 Oune 1970); Men's, Youth's &: Boys' Footwear of Leather, Tariff
Commn. Puhl. No. 324, at 7-9 Oune 1970). The Attorney General advised the President
that he has authority to break tie votes in firms' and workers' cases. White House Press
Release of Oct. 7, 1970, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970). The
Attorney General's memorandum has not been published.
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be granted? The following brief analysis of the Commission's decisions ·will consider how these questions have been answered.

A. Escape Clause Cases
In Pianos and Parts Thereof, 54 a majority of three Commissioners
recommended that the industry be given tariff relief. Imports began
to increase in the mid-fifties. The statutory tariff had been cut in
half in 1951. This cut was followed by minor reductions during the
period of 1956 to 1958 and further reductions of 2% and 1.5% on
January 1, 1968, and January 1, 1969, respectively. 55 Commissioners
Clubb and Moore, citing their opinions in the Buttweld Pipe and
Transmission Towers cases, applied the "but for" test; 56 Commissioner Leonard, concurring, did not. 57 He observed that the most
dramatic upsurge of imports had followed the Kennedy Round reductions in 1968 and 1969. (Imports increased in 1968 by more than
70% and in 1969 by more than 100% over the 1965-1967 average.)
He noted that there were reasons other than these increased imports58
for the idling of capacity, the losses by one third of the firms, and
the decline in employment, but held that the spectacular recent rise
in imports was the major factor in threatening to cause serious injury. 59 The two dissenters denied such a threat, arguing that "relatively low profit rates" were accompanied by stable demand. 60 The
President suspended tariff reductions, which were scheduled to take
effect in 1970, 1971, and 1972, and authorized firms and workers
to apply for adjustment assistance.61 It should be noted that, as
Commissioner Leonard's opinion indicates, the "but for" test was
not necessary to reach an affirmative finding in this case.
Barbers' Chairs and Parts Thereo/62 was an atypical escape clause
54, Pianos &: Parts Thereof, Tariff Comm.n. Publ. No. 309 (Dec. 1969). Five Commissioners voted; one was absent.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 13. "The changing pattern of life in the United States," (e.g., "growing
interest in other musical instruments and many other kinds of recreation").
59. Id, at 10-11.
60. Id. at 23,
ol. Proclamation No. 3964, 35 Fed. Reg. 3645 (1970). See White House statement
accompanying the proclamation in 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRF.SIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 261,
262 (1970), stressing that this was a case "for which adjustment assistance was meant
to apply."
62. Barbers' Chairs &: Parts Thereof, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 319 (April 1970)
[hereinafter Barbers' Chairs I]. In a preceding investigation the Commission had denied relief. Barbers' Chairs, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 228 (Jan. 1968). The industry
consisted of only two firms, one of which was doing well. The increase in imports was
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case in which the Commission was equally divided. One of the two
domestic firms had been absorbed by the principal Japanese exporter
of barber chairs who had thus obtained a dominant position in
the United States market, which he exploited by raising his prices.
The three Commissioners, voting against relief for the remaining
American-mvned firm, attributed that firm's serious injury to inefficiency and to unlawful conduct by its Japanese rival; 03 hence trade
concessions and increased imports were irrelevant. Indeed, it would
appear that the acquisition by the Japanese producer of an American
firm in an industry consisting of only two firms of equal size was a
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 64 In any event, there was
only one firm that needed relief; therefore individual adjustment
assistance was the proper remedy. 65
·Nonrubber Footwear, 66 an investigation undertaken at the request of the President, resulted in an equally divided report on
which the President took no action. Commissioners Clubb and Moore
based their affirmative votes on the "but for" test that they had previously espoused67 but they could not gamer additional votes because
attributed to the rise of Japan as an industrial power, the effective distribution in the
United States of Japanese imports, and the reduction in ocean freight rates.
63. :Barbers' Chairs I, supra note 62, at 10-11.
·54. Compare United States v. Monsanto Co., 1967 Trade Cas. 1f 72,001 (W.D. Pa,
1967), in which a joint venture between Monsanto and a leading German chemical
firm was prohibited because of its adverse effect on competition in the United States.
For comments on the case, see the statement by E.M. Zimmerman, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, in Hearings on International Aspects of Antitrust Before
the Subcomm. of Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 502 (1966).
65. In the petition filed by the Emil J. Paidar Co., :Barbers' Chairs 8: Parts Thereof,
Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 320 (April 1970), the three Commissioners who had voted
against relief in the escape clause investigation again voted to deny relief. Id, at 4.
Commissioners Clubb, Moore, and Thunberg voted for relief on the ground that the
most recent reduction in duties from 10% to 8% ad valorem had made Paidar's situation hopeless. Id. at 7-8, 14. The President authorized adjustment assistance "for current operations and to expand production of other types of professional equipment,"
but refused tariff relief because it would "curtail imports." White House statement of
June 23, 1970, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRE.5IDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 808 (1970).
66. Nonrubber Footwear, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 359 Gan. 1971), noted in Recent
Decision, 7 TEXAS INTI.. L.J. 163 (1971).
67. Nonrubber Footwear, supra note 66, at 13. The duties on 60% of the men's
footwear and 55% of the women's footwear imports were cut from the statutory level
of 20% and 35%, respectively, to 8.5% and 6%, respectively. In the first category there
were no cuts between 1943 and 1968; in the second category the first cut occurred in
1963. One hundred thirteen firms had sustained losses, output and profits of others
declined, and imports accounted for one third of the United States market. This situation constituted a threat to the American industries involved, which could be remedied
by tariff increases on four items and "an adjustment assistance program" for firms and
workers. Id. at 24a.
See also :Bagatelle, :Billiard &: Pool :Balls, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 374 (March 1971),
in which there was a unanimous negative finding. Commissioners Clubb and Moore
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only four Commissioners participated in the decision. 68 Commissioners Sutton and Leonard voted in the negative. They pointed out
that the time lag between the concessions and the increased imports
was so long as to negative causation and that the Kennedy Round
reductions, which began on January I, 1968, were irrelevant because
imports increased sharply prior to that date. 69 Moreover, the bulk
of the reductions on the most important items on women's shoes was
attributable to the adoption of the Tariff Schedules of the United
States and not to the Kennedy Round.7° Commissioner Leonard
called attention to the disparity between United States and foreign
wage rates, limited gains in American productivity, and rapid United
States price increases, all of which he considered more important
factors than tariff reductions.71 In short, the erosion of American
competitiveness was primarily due to inflation.
It should be noted that shortly before this decision was handed
down the House of Representatives passed The Trade Act of
1970,72 a bill that provided for mandatory quotas on "the total
quantity of each category of textile articles and ... of footwear articles ... produced in any foreign country which ..• shall not exceed
the average annual quantity of such category produced in such country and entered during 1967, 1968, and 1969." The bill died in the
Senate with the expiration of the Ninety-first Congress. The contrast
between this very drastic measure, which would have violated the
prohibition of quotas in article XI, paragraph 1 of GATT,73 and
the modest proposals for industry relief by Commissioners Clubb
and Moore,74 who found no present injury but only a threat of injury, is most striking. It shows that even the members of the Tariff
Commission most inclined to grant industry and individual relief
are likely to recommend measures far more compatible with the
found the first causation requirement satisfied by the "but for" test, but found no
causation of serious injury. Id. at 4-6. Commissioners Sutton and Leonard denied first
causation on the ground that the concessions were made 25 years ago. Id. at 3.
68. At the time of this decision the office of chairman was vacant, and Commissioner
Young did not participate.
69. Nonrubber Footwear, supra note 66, at 38.
70. Id. at 29.
71. Id. at 44-45.
72. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 20l(a) (1970).
73. See Fulda, :Book Review, 69 MICH. L. R.Ev. 783, 784 (1971).
74. Commissioners Clubb and Moore recommended that the minor tariff reductions
of the Kennedy Round on the most important item of men's foot:lvear be cancelled,
and that the tariff which was in effect in 1969 on three items of women's foot:l'lear
be maintained, thus eliminating the reductions scheduled for 1970, 1971, and 1972.
Nonrubber Footwear, supra note 66, at 14, 17, 24a.
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GATT system of liberalized trade than a Congress bending under
protectionist pressures. The escape clause and individual adjustment
assistance thus provide a necessary safety valve without which trade
liberalization could not continue.
The remaining recent decisions further illustrate that the ravages
of United States inflation exceed the damage attributed to tariff concessions. Indeed, in Umbrellas and Metal Parts,1° Commissioners
Clubb and Moore observed that "even the imposition of the 1930
rates of duty would not have substantially affected U. S. imports
of umbrellas" 76 because average wholesale prices of imports would
still be $17 per dozen cheaper than domestic articles. 77 Similarly,
in Flat Glass and Tempered Glass,18 it was noted that the increase
in prices of glass in the domestic market "has eroded materially the
protective effect of U. S. import duties" 79 and "made the U. S. market attractive to foreign suppliers." 80 In this case, the Commission
denied relief for four types of glass products but was equally divided
in regard to sheet glass, which the majority considered to be a sepa•
rate industry. Sheet glass had been the subject of escape clause relief
in 1962,81 which had been terminated for some items and reduced
for others in 1967.82 These reduced increases were scheduled to expire on March 31, 1970.83 Three Commissioners recommended relief
for sheet glass on the ground that the 1967 modifications of the escape clause relief were the major cause of increased imports, 84 which
in tum caused a downward trend in profits. 85 They were, however,
75. Umbrellas & Metal Parts Thereof, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 334 (Aug. 1970)
(relief denied by 3-to-1 vote).
76. Id. at 5.
77. The average wholesale price of imported umbrellas at the statutory rate of 40%
ad valorem would be $21 per dozen, compared with $38 per dozen for domestically
produced products. Id. at 6. The duty for umbrellas was cut in half in 1950. Id. at A-4.
78. Flat Glass & Tempered Glass, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 310 (Dec. 1969) (relief
denied by 4-to-2 vote in the cases of rolled, plate, float, and tempered glass).
79. Id. at 40.
80. Id. at 41.
'81. Proclamation No. 3455 of March 19, 1962 (76 Stat. 1454); Proclamation No. 3458
of March 27, 1962 (76 Stat. 1457). Proclamation No. 3548 of Aug. 21, 1963 (77 Stat. 1017)
pursuant to § 102 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970)),
incorporated the increased duties into the Tariff Schedules of the United States.
82. Proclamation No. 3762 of Jan. 11, 1967 (81 Stat. 1076).
83. Proclamation No.' 3816 of Oct. 11, 1967 (81 Stat. 1139); Proclamation No. 3951
of Dec. 24, 1969, 34 Fed. Reg. 20381 (1969).
84. Flat Glass & Tempered Glass, supra note 78, at 7. See also Sheet Glass (Blown
or Drawn Flat Glass), Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 306 (Dec. 1969).
85. Flat Glass &: Tempered Glass, supra note 78, at 29. Commissioner Thunberg
held that sheet glass was not a separate industry (id. at 19); Commissioner Leonard
observed that decreased demand for sheet glass was not due to imports, but to increased
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divided about the appropriate remedy: Commissioners Sutton and
Moore recommended imposition of the statutory rates 86 while Commissioner Clubb favored adjustment assistance to firms and workers
rather than import restrictions. 87 The President followed the latter
course by directing the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor to certify
eligible workers and firms for assistance. He also directed continuation of the escape clause relief until January 31, 1972; thereafter
it was to be phased out in a two-year period.88 The Commission has
advised the President that a partial termination of the escape clause
relief would adversely affect the sheet glass industry.89
Marble and Travertine Products90 resulted in an equally divided
Commission. Chairman Bedell91 and Commissioner Moore recommended tariff increases that would restore the statutory rate for two
items and exceed it with respect to one item.92 They argued that the
"but for" test required this result while Commissioners Leonard
and Young stressed that imports did not increase until ten years
after the rates were cut in half. 93 In their view, domestic inflation
was the primary factor. 94 Indeed, the data relied on by all four Commissioners indicated that restoration of statutory duties would not
eliminate the price advantage of the imported articles.95 For that
reason, and because he did not want to increase domestic construction costs, the President refused to proclaim tariff increases but asked
the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce to consider requests for
adjustment assistance by individual firms and workers. 96 In the
competition of float glass (id. at 35); Commissioner Newsom denied the existence of
serious injury (id. at 43).
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id. at 31 ("[I]njury has been unevenly felt within the industry. Certain aggressive firms with modem plants are very healthy and need no assistance to compete
effectively ••• .'').
88. Proclamation No. 3967 of Feb. 27, 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 3975-77 (1970); White House
Press Release, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 287 (1970).
89. Sheet Glass (Blown or Drawn Flat Glass), Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 449 (Dec.
1971). For subsequent developments see Proclamation No. 4102 of Jan. 29, 1972, 37 Fed.
Reg. 2417; Flat Glass and Tempered Glass, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 459 Gan. 1972).
90. Marble&: Travertine Products, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 420 (Sept. 1971).
91. Commissioner Clubb's term had expired.
92. Marble &: Travertine Products, supra note 90, at 16.
93. Id. at 19.
94. Id. at 23.
95. Id. at 21. Significantly, the opinion by Chairman Bedell and Commissioner
Moore, which recommended tariff relief, includes a table showing price comparisons
on four domestic job sites, for three of which the delivered prices of foreign materials,
taxed at the statutory rate, would be considerably lower than for domestically fabricated goods. Id. at 12.
96. 8 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 148 (1972). The President also
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last industry case of 1971, Television Receivers and Certain Parts
Thereof, 91 five Commissioners denied relief on the ground that the
increased imports were due in major part to dumping rather than
to trade concessions.
It thus appears that the decisions on industry petitions since the
end of 1969 dramatize the erosion of American competitiveness resulting from domestic inflation. Indeed, there could be no more
drastic evidence of this fact than the finding in some cases that
restoration of the 1930 duties, the highest in United States history,08
would not be sufficient protection. It should also be noted that in
three of the industry investigations individual adjustment was chosen
as the most appropriate remedy. Significantly, in two of these cases,
the industry relief ultimately adopted consisted only of maintenance
of the status quo by postponement of future reductions or continuation of previously granted escape clause relief that otherwise would
have expired. Last, but not least, in none of these decisions did the
"but for" test prevail.

B. Firm Petitions
In two cases involving producers of Stainless-Steel Table Flatware,99 causation presented no difficulties. In October 1967 the President allowed a tariff quota that had been in effect for eight years
to expire, thus re-establishing the trade agreement concessions that
had been suspended as a result of the escape clause action.100 Immediately thereafter, imports increased rapidly from 9.2 million dozen
pieces during the last year of the tariff quota to 34.4 million in
1970.101 Substantial operating losses were suffered because of the preference for foreign supplies by the customers of the two firms.102
Under these circumstances, the unanimous grant of adjustment asdecided to seek elimination of tariffs on unfinished marble imports, which are vital
to domestic production. This may be the first time that a liberalizing measure was
recommended as an answ·er to an escape clause petition.
97. Television Receivers &: Certain Parts Thereof, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 436
(Nov. 1971)•.
98. See note 35 supra.
99. Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 393 (May 1971) [here•
inafter Flatware I]; Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 414
(Aug. 1971). A workers' petition by the employees of the firm involved in Flatware I,
supra, was granted in Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 442
(Dec. 1971).
100. See 19 U.S.C. § 1981(c)(l) (1970).
101. Flatware I, supra note 99, at 3-4.
102. A workers' petition involving three idle plants of the International Silver Co.
had previously been granted. Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Publ. No.
347 (Dec. 1970).
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sistance was a foregone conclusion under any conceivable interpretation of the statute. Indeed, as a result of negotiations with the
interested contracting parties of GATT, the President re-established
a tariff quota for stainless steel.103
Similarly uncontroversial, at least with respect to the first causation requirement, is the recent decision in Cotton Osnaburgs a:nd
Sheetings.104 Imports of coarse cotton sheeting, the principal product
of the petitioner, had increased at an annual rate of 22% from 1964
to 1970. The current rates of duty were 40% less than in 1930. The
major concessions had occurred in 1948 and 1956 followed by annual
minor Kennedy Round concessions beginning in 1968.105 However,
there was evidence that in this highly competitive market "a small
price difference, even of one fourth of a cent in the case of some types,
may well be sufficient to determine whether a sale is made or lost."108
The profit position of petitioner's plant, which closed in June 1971,
deteriorated during the period of implementation of the. Kennedy
Round.107 Under these circumstances, four Commissioners concluded
that the recent Kennedy Round reductions in duties were the major
cause of the increased imports, which in tum were responsible for
the collapse of the firm and the unemployment of its workers.108
The dissenters objected only to the second finding of causation; in
their view the loss of military business and domestic competition
rather than increased imports were to blame for the petitioner's
misfortune.109
When recent increases in imports are not or cannot be attributed
103. Proclamation No. 4076 of Aug. 21, 1971, 26 Fed. Reg. 16561 (1971).
104. Cotton Osnaburgs & Sheetings, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 426 (Oct. 1971).
105. Id. at 4-5.
106. Id. at 6. In Women's & Misses' Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 223
Oune 1970), Telief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971),
the three Commissioners voting in favor of adjustment assistance for the firm and workers noted that modest concessions can cause the demise of marginal operators. Id. at Ill.
Accord, Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 379 (April 1971), Telief granted,
7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRF.SIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971). Compare Women's Vinyl
Sandals, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 437 (Nov. 1971) (one cent a pair reduction in duty
could not have caused 19 million pair increase in imports; low labor costs were more
important than tariff reductions).
107. Cotton Osnaburgs & Sheetings, supra note 104, at 7.
108. Id. at 5-6. The majority opinion in Certain Yams, Fabrics & Other Textile
Products, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 422 (Nov. 1971), follows Cotton Osnaburgs. The two
dissenters attributed the manufacturer's troubles to difficulties in modernizing its
plant and denied that either of the causation requirements had been met. Certain
Yarns, supm, at 12-lll, 28-29. One of the dissenters wrote a letter to the President accusing the Commission of procedural irregularities.
109. Cotton Osnaburgs & Sheetings, supra note 104, at 10-12. On that ground a
unanimous Commission denied the petition in Certain Cotton Yarns & Fabrics, Tariff
Commn. Pub!. No. 275 (March 1971).
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to recent trade concessions, petitioners face a more complicated problem, as illustrated by the three-to-one vote in Certain Woven Fabrics.110 The company had closed its mill at the end of 1969 following
three years of operating losses. Duties on the type of cotton cloth that
the firm was making had decreased from 1930 to 1969 by about one
third, the largest reduction having occurred in 1955. Imports of
cotton cloth during the latter part of the sixties were several times
greater than in 1955. As to fabrics of man-made fibers, the major
reductions of tariffs occurred in 1936, 1948, and 1951 but import
increases became substantial only in 1959 and have grown ever
since.111 Commissioners Sutton, Clubb, and Moore held that the firm's
injury had been caused by concession-generated increased imports,
which had deprived it of customers and prevented it from shifting to
fabrics outside its customary line.112 Commissioner Leonard's dissent
denied causation on both counts. He noted that the bulk of the reduction in rates was made long before there was any significant increase in imports, that some imported shirts would undersell like
domestic products even if the 1930 rate were to be restored, and that
lower foreign labor costs and the company's inability to adapt itself
to changes in demand that occur every five or six years were the major
causes of the shutdown.113 Although the "but for" test was not explicitly mentioned in either opinion, it would seem that the majority
relied on it because they ignored the time lag between concessions
and increased imports and because there was a disagreement about
the causes of the company's shutdown.
In three of the cases in which the President broke a tie vote by
ordering relief, there were votes by Commissioners Clubb and Moore
for petitioners based on the "but for" test, and votes by Commissioners Sutton and Leonard against petitioners rejecting the "but for"
test. Coils and Antennas114 involved a plant producing component
parts for radio and television receivers that were competitive with
imported parts. Imports had tripled between 1966 and 1970. The
major duty reductions, accounting for 75% of total reductions, oc110. Certain Woven Fabrics, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 342 (Nov. 1970) [hereinafter
Woven Fabrics]. A petition by workers of the same company was granted in Certain
Woven Fabrics, Tariff Commn. Pub]. No. 357 (March 1971).
111. Woven Fabrics, supra note 110, at 4.
112. Id. at 4-5.
113. Id. at 8-9. On the same grounds three Commissioners voted for denial in Men's
& :Boys' Shirts, Not Knit, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 439, at 9 (Nov, 1971). Three other
Commissioners voted for relief. Id. at 3. As of Feb. 1, 1972, the President had not acted.
114. Coils & Antennas, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 385 (April 1971) (Commission
equally divided), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DocUMENTS 854 (1971).
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curred more than two decades ago, long before these items became
significant articles of commerce.115 On that basis, the issue between
the proponents and opponents of the "but for" test was clearly drawn.
The President made the ultimate decision for the proponents. The
equal division was due to one vacancy and one Commissioner's absence.116
Practically on all fours are two other cases in which two vacancies
on the six-member Commission produced equal division, thus permitting the President to intervene: High Fidelity Stereo and Related
Equipment 111 and Electrolytic Capacitors. 118 But in a later case involving another firm that produced capacitors, the petition was denied by a «vo-to-one vote.119 Since Commissioners Clubb and Young
did not participate, Commissioners Sutton and Leonard, opponents
of "but for," constituted the majority. Hence the President could not
act.
These decisions indicate that sharp increases in imports during
the latter part of the 1960's, when the inflationary boom accelerated,120
are being evaluated differently by different groups of Commissioners.
Those who hold that these increases would not have occurred if the
tariff rates of 1930 had not been reduced and who also find serious
injury or a threat thereof will prevail when absences or vacancies
place them in the majority or when the President breaks a tie vote.
In some cases, the "but for" advocates were in the minority. For
instance in Women's Casual Shoes,121 relief was denied by a two-to115. Id. at 3-4.
116. At the time of this decision the office of chairman was vacant and Commissioner
Young did not participate.
117. High Fidelity Stereo 8: Related Equipment, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 355 (Jan.
1971), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 475 (1971). Increases
in imports occurred from 1965-1969; principal reductions in duties ended in 1951,
followed by ½% reductions in the Kennedy Round. Commissioners Sutton and Leonard
held that even at the statutory rate imported products would still be cheaper than
domestic ones (id. at 5), while Commissioners Clubb and Moore, espousing the "but
for" test, stated that the price differential in favor of imports was equal to duty reduction (id. at 9). This was a disagreement about the evidence: It would, of course, be
consistent with the "but for" test to deny causation if the price differential in favor
of imports would persist even if the statutory rates were restored.
118. Electrolytic Capacitors, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 335 (Aug. 1970), relief granted,
6 WEEKLY Coin>. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970). The statutory duty of 35%
had been reduced in 1951 to 12.5%. Kennedy Round reductions in the late sixties
were minor. Commissioners Clubb and Moore held that imports would not have in•
creased if the 1930 rate had remained in effect.
119. Capacitors &: Semiconductors, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 394 (May 1971). Petitions by the workers of the same company were denied in Capacitors 8: Semiconductors,
Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 395 (May 1971).
120. See The Troubles of U.S. Trade, MORGAN GUARANTY SURVEY, Sept. 1971, at 3, 6-7.
121. Women's Casual Shoes, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 405 (July 1971). A practically
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one vote with t1vo vacancies and one absence. 122 Both sides referred
to their respective opinions in Nonrubber Footwear. 123
There have also been unanimous denials of firm petitions. In
one case involving women's shoes,124 there was the usual division
with regard to the first causation requirement125 but unanimity in
:finding the absence of serious injury or threat thereof.126 In another
case relating to similar articles, the difficulties of the firm, ,vhich was
still in operation, ·were attributed to specialization in high priced
shoes, for which import competition was not severe, and to the
domestic recession.127 The Commission denied any connection bet1veen increased imports and trade concessions in the case of articles
that have been on the free list with a commitment by the United
States to keep them there.128
·
The question whether a domestic article is "like or directly competitive with the imported article"129 has been raised in several cases
involving imports of component parts of :finished products. According to what seems to be the majority view, the requirement is not
met, and the case must consequently be dismissed, when imports of
the component parts that are competitive with domestically manufactured parts have not increased; the fact that imports of :finished
products containing the component parts have increased 'is deemed
identical case is Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 416 (Aug. 1971), in
which a 2-to-l majority denied relief. See also Men's & Women's Footwear, Tariff
Commn. Publ. No. 419 (Sept. 1971), in which a 3-to-l majority denied relief. Chairman
Bedell and Commissioner Young concluded that the cause of injury was not increased
imports but domestic competition and changes in styles. Id. at 4. Commissioner Moore,
dissenting (id. at 9), referred to his opinion in Nonrubber Footwear (discussed in text
accompanying note 67 supra).
122. Commissioners Sutton and Leonard formed the majority, Commissioner Moore
dissented, and Commissioner Young did not participate.
123. Women's Casual Shoes, supra note 121, at 3, 6. For a discussion of Nonruhhcr
Footwear, see text accompanying notes 66-71 supra.
124. Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 388 (April 1971).
125. Id. at 3 (Commissioners Sutton and Leonard holding increased imports not in
major part a result of concessions), 5 (Commissioners Clubb and Moore holding in•
creased imports were in major part a result of concessions).
126. Id. at 3, 5. In Men's Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 427, at 3 (Oct. 1971),
"a small net loss" after three profitable years was held not to amount to injury or a
threat thereof.
127. Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 411 Guly 1971). See also Men's
Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 421 (Sept. 1971) (imports not the major factor
when the company, after closing its plant, purchased 90% of its requirements from
domestic manufacturers and imported the balance).
128. Manual Office Typewriters, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 358 Gan. 1971).
129. 19 U.S.C. § 190l(b)(l) (1970). See also 19 U.S.C. § 190l(c)(l)-(2) (1970). "Directly
competitive with" is defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1806(4) (1970).
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irrelevant.130 On the other hand, some cases hold that parts imported
as components of finished products are competitive with parts manufactured by domestic producers:181 The latter view would seem to
be preferable, provided it can be shown that increased imports of
the finished products have injured domestic producers and their
suppliers.
Finally, in a recent case the Commission unanimously denied a
petition by a firm organized in 1969, which had purchased a plant
that had previously incurred substantial losses.132 The unfavorable
operating results were found to be due to a change in customer preferences: mass-produced photographic lenses, formerly the principal
products of the plant, had lost popularity in favor of more sophisticated and more costly products. Imports, stimulated at least to some
degree by Kennedy Round concessions, increased prior to the takeover of the plant by petitioner but not thereafter. The Commission's
conclusion that increased imports were not the major factor causing
or threatening to cause injury to the firm was, therefore, based not
only on the finding of "changes in the product-mix,"133 but also
on the novel proposition that a newly organized firm operating in a
plant acquired from another firm must be presumed to be aware of
the threat of imports that the selling firm had to face. 134 In other
130. See Paper Cones for Loudspeakers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 362 (Feb. 1971),
in which relief was denied unanimously in four concurring opinions. Commissioner Sutton observed that paper cones were not being imported as such and that "it is wholly
untenable • • • to regard loudspeakers, radios, television receivers, or other fabricated
goods having paper cones as component parts thereof as being paper cones at a later
stage of processing." Id. at 9. See also Certain Variable Electrical Capacitors, Tariff
Commn. Publ. No. 423 (Oct. 1971) (unanimous denial). In Heels, Soles&: Soling Sheets,
Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 441 (Dec. 1971), Commissioners Parker and Leonard accepted
this view, saying "a shoe cannot be deemed to be a heel ••••" Id. at 7. Commissioners
Moore and Young denied relief on other grounds. Id. at 5.
131. Electronic Transformers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 351 Gan. 1971) (workers'
petition granted by 2-to-1 vote). See also Coils 8e Antennas, Tariff Commn. Publ. No.
385 (April 1971) (Commission equally divided), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRESIDENTIAL DocUMENTS 854 (1971). The Electronics Transformers case was cited by
Commissioner Moore in his dissent in Heels for Women's Footwear, Tariff Commn.
Publ. No. 440, at 10 (Nov. 1971).
132. Optical Elements, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 425 (Oct. 1971).
133. Id. at 4.
134. Id. at 5. Accord, Certain Bovine Leather, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 433, at 7
(Nov. 1971). Other reasons for the denial in Bovine Leather were obsolete facilities and
the fact that the firm was a processor but not a producer and 19 U.S.C. § 190l(c)(l)
(1970) (which delineates the requirements for adjustment assistance) applies only to
producers. Id. at 3-6. This was the first holding interpreting the statute so narrowly.
Petitioner was tanning hides according to the specifications of his customer, and this
operation was held to be a service. The legislative policy would be better served if
the tanning were considered tantamount to production.
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words, the acquiring firm cannot ground its petition for adjustment
assistance on the fact that it has made a bad bargain; its request for
relief must be founded on facts that developed after the acquisition.
This proposition seems thoroughly sound.
C.

Workers' Petitions

I. Relief Granted by the Commission
Subsequent to the path-breaking Buttweld Pipe and Transmission Towers decision discussed above,135 the Commission granted
additional workers' petitions. Relief in some of the subsequent cases
might have been granted even if those prior cases had not been decided the way they were. Two cases grew out of the escape clause
investigation of Pianos and Parts Thereo/; 136 both stressed that the
increases in imports coincided with Kennedy Round reductions and
that customers of the now closed plants had turned to imports. 137
In two other successful workers' petition cases, the employers
themselves had begun to substitute imports for their own production;
this practice was held to be the major factor for petitioners' unemployment.188 The reasons for switching to imports were not explained;
the result is convincing only if it is assumed that the increase of
concession-generated imports139 forced the employers to curtail or
abandon their own production.
Only nvo grants to workers and one to salaried employees rested
explicitly on the "but for" doctrine, that if the 1930 rates had not
been reduced imports would not have reached their present levels,
and that the unemployment would not have occurred if the imports
had not increased.140 It is noteworthy that in one of these reports
the majority, consisting of Commissioners Thunberg, Clubb, and
135. See pt. IV. supra.
136. Pianos & Parts Thereof, supra note 55, discussed in text accompanying notes
54-61 supra.
137. Piano Actions, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 331, at 3 Ouly 1970); Piano Keyboards,
Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 352, at 4 Gan. 1971).
138. Silver-Plated & Stainless-Steel Table Holloware, Tariff Commn. Publ. No, 348,
at 6 (Dec. 1970) (3-to•l vote) (hereinafter Holloware]; Women's Leather Shoes, Tariff
Commn. Publ. No. 353, at 5 Gan. 1971) (2-to-1 vote). The dissenters suggested that
softness in the economy and changes in market demand were the major causes of
unemployment. Holloware supra at 8-9; Women's Leather Shoes, supra at 'l-8.
139. In both Holloware (supra note 138, at 5) and Women's Leather Shoes (supra
note 138, at 11), increases in imports followed the most recent concessions.
140. Plastic or Rubber-Soled Footwear with Fabric Uppers, Tariff Commn. Publ.
No. 321 (April 1970) (3-to-2 vote) (workers and salaried employees); Transformers,
Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 351 Gan. 1971) (2-to-1 vote). Recent Kennedy Round re•
ductions were mentioned, but were apparently deemed to be of no importance.
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Moore, described the plant that had just closed as a "marginal enterprise" located in a building originally constructed in 1889.141 Inexpensive products, which were in greatest demand, could not have
been produced at this plant without new investment. "Large volumes" of such products had been produced domestically.142 Under
these circumstances, the finding that "but for" the imports there would
have been no unemployment is open to serious question since superannuated enterprises are not likely to be able to compete in the
domestic market. Hence the unemployment cannot have been due
in major part to increased imports. The decision is inconsistent with
several unanimous denials to be discussed later.143
A recent grant of a workers' petition involved imports of polyester
cotton fabrics. 144 The duty on the bulk of these imports had not
changed since 1958, while the increases in imports occurred during
the latter half of the sixties. Commissioner Leonard's dissent denied
the connection between trade concessions and increased imports,
relying on the statement of the employer, who attributed his plight
to low foreign wages.145

2. Relief Granted by Presidential Action
We discussed above the firm petitions ultimately decided by the
President by breaking a tie vote in favor of relief.146 The same difficulty occurred in certain workers' cases. These cases pose the procedural problem of whether tie votes can be avoided. Since Congress
entrusted the decision to the Commission in the first place, we must
assume that the Presidential authority to break tie votes was intended
only as a last resort in case of deadlock.147 A deadlock is inescapable
when all six Commissioners148 participate in a three-to-three vote or, as
has repeatedly happened, the Commission's membership is reduced
to four through vacancies and the votes are equally divided.149 Apart
141. Plastic or Rubber-Soled Footwear, supra note 140, at 9.
142. Id. at IO.
143. See pt. V. C. 3. infra.
144. Broadwoven Polyester-Cotton Fabrics, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 434 (Nov. 1971).
145. Id. at 7.
146. See text accompanying notes 114-19 supra.
147. By contrast, § l(a) of the Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), provides
that the Tariff Commission "shall be deemed to have made an affirmative determination
if the Commissioners voting ••. are evenly divided ••••"
148. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1970), establishes a Commission of six members.
149. See, e.g., Automotive Soft Trim, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 333 (Aug. 1970),
relief granted, 6 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRFSmENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970); Protective
Footwear of Rubber or Plastics, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 330 Guly 1970), relief granted,
6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRFSIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970); Electrical Components &
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from these situations, tie votes should be avoided by requiring every
sitting Commissioner to participate. But no such requirement has
been imposed.160
In most of the workers' cases decided by the President in favor
of the petitioners, Commissioners Clubb and Moore, the originators
of the "but for" test, had voted for relief, and Commissioners Sutton
and Leonard, opponents of that test, for rejection. Perhaps noteworthy is Deflection Yokes and Horizontal Output Transformers,11l1
in which the statement that the major concessions had occurred more
than two decades earlier162 was answered by the counterstatement
that trade agreement concessions since 1930 were "a decisive factor
contributing to the increased imports,"163 which in turn had caused
the unemployment. The plant had been sold and the employer had
moved its operations first to Portugal and then to Mexico.m With
respect to the second causation requirement, the "but for" test presumably implied that the employer could meet import competition
only by producing abroad. Foreign investment may thus adversely
affect employment in this country166 when domestic firms feel compelled to emigrate.166
Apparatus &: Allied Products, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 329 Uuly 1970), relief granted,
6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970).
150. In four cases in which the President broke the tie, one or two Commissioners
did not participate. Women's &: Misses' Footwear, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 361 (Feb.
1971) equally divided ':Otes in TEA-W-37 through -41, -44-, -47, -49, -54), relief granted,
7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971); Women's, Children's & Infants' Footwear, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 369 (March 1971) (equally divided votes in
TEA-W-59-65), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY Co:r.lP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618
(1971); Deflection Yokes&: Horizontal Output Transformers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No.
386 (1971), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 854 (1971);
Pipe Organs, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 397 Uune 1971), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1097 (1971).
151. Deflection Yokes&: Horizontal Output Transformers, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No.
386 (April 1971), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 854
(1971).
152. Id. at 3-4.
153. Id. at 7. Similar arguments were made in Pipe Organs, Tariff Commn. Puhl.
No. 397, at 7-8 aune 1971), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY CO:r.lP, OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS
1097 (1971).
154. Deflection Yokes&: Horizontal Output Transformers, supra note 151, at 9.
155. It may also affect American exports if the firm moves abroad in order to
produce inside foreign tariff walls to save costs in lieu of exporting from the United
States. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 'POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WoRLD,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMN. ON INTL. TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY 175
(1971) [hereinafter WILLIAMS REPORT], states that in 1968 United States imports from
American owned foreign manufacturing plants amounted only to $400 million. For a
more pessimistic view of the adverse effect of these imports on United States employment, see the statement of Paul Jennings, President, International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, in Hearings Before Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy
of Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 813-21 (1970).
156. In Automotive Soft Trim, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 333 (Aug. 1970), relief
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An even more complicated problem of foreign operations by an
employer was presented in Electronic Components and Apparatus,151
in which the employer of the displaced workers had moved the bulk
of its production of television receiver components abroad. It sold
some of these components in Asia and Europe but the major part of
its foreign output was shipped to the United States for sale to domestic producers of television receivers. Many of these imported components were entered under Tariff Schedules Item 807.00, which
exempts from United States duty the value of the United States
components contained in the entered articles.158 The disagreement
between the Commissioners related not only to the application of
the "but for" test to the first causation requirement but also to the
evaluation of the foreign operations of the employer. Commissioners
Clubb and Moore concluded that the attractiveness of the increased
imports of components had forced the employer "to become an importer himself," 159 while Commissioners Sutton and Leonard held
that the unemployment resulted principally from a management
decision to manufacture abroad.160 That decision was apparently
motivated in large measure by the desire to take advantage of the
special tariff treatment accorded by United States law to articles
assembled abroad with components produced in the United States.
The real question, then, was whether the employer would have used
this loophole in American tariff law, the repeal of which has been
proposed,161 even if there had been no increased import competition
or whether this was a defensive strategy necessitated by such competition. A finding of causation between increased imports and unemployment would be justified only in the latter alternative.
Most of the remaining split decisions resolved in favor of the
granted, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970), the disagreement
within the Commission concerned whether the employer's decision to shift production
to Ontario was due to the Canadian-American Automotive Agreement of Jan. 16, 1965,
([1966] I U.S.T. 1372, T.I.A.S. No. 6093, codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2001-33 (1970)), which
permitted duty-free entry of automotive parts from Canada into the United States, or
due to the sale by American Motors of its Kelvinator Division, within which the Soft
Trim operations were located.
157. Electronic Components &: Apparatus, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 329 Ouly 1970),
relief granted, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970).
158. Id. at 4. Item 807.00, Revised Tariff schedule of the United States, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1202 (1970), provides preferential tariff treatment for:
Articles assembled abroad in whole or in part of fabricated components, the product of the United States, which (a) were exported in condition ready for assembly
without further fabrication, (b) have not lost their physical identity in such articles
by change in form, shape, or othenvise, and (c) have not been advanced in value or
improved in condition abroad except by being assembled and except by operations
incidental to the assembly process such as cleaning, lubricating and painting.
159. Electronic Components &: Apparatus, supra note 157, at IO.
160. Id. at 4-5.
161. See H.R. 6550, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 14188, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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petitioners by Presidential action concerned workers employed in
the footwear industry. There was the familiar disagreement about
the effect of ancient trade agreement concessions on increased imports and about whether increased imports or other factors were the
major cause in bringing about unemployment. 162
Particularly striking are the conflicting opinions in a case concerning the workers of four shoe manufacturers, Women's and Misses'
Dress Shoes (Lemar Shoes), 163 in which Commissioners Sutton, Leonard, and Newsom held that most increased imports occurred prior
to the first reductions in duty on January I, 1968, when European
"fashion leadership" had stimulated imports,164 while Commissioners
Thunberg, Clubb, and Moore found that the 140% increase in imports from 1965 through 1969 would not have reached their present
level without the modest tariff concessions of the Kennedy Round,
which were fatal to marginal operations.166 The President broke the
deadlock in this and in nine other footwear workers' cases in which
Commissioners Clubb and Moore relied on their opinion in Lemar
Shoes to support their votes for relief.166
3. Denials of Petitions by the Commission
The numerous denials of workers' petitions can be classified into
several distinct categories. First, as previously observed in some of
162. Protective Footwear of Rubber or Plastics, Tariff Commn. Publ. No, 330 CTuly
1970) (equal division in plastic- or rubber-soled footwear), relief granted, 6 WEEKL\'
COMP. OF PREsIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970); Women's, Children's &: Infants' Foot•
wear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 369 (March 1971) (equally divided votes in TEA-W-59
&: -65), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971); Women's
&: Misses' Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 361 (Feb, 1971) (equally divided votes
in TEA-W-37 through -41, -44, -47, -49, -54), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESI•
DENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971) (Commissioners Clubb and Moore, referring to their
opinion in Women's & Misses' Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No, 323, at 13 CTune
1970), indicated in connection with the first causation requirement that recent modest
tariff concessions "can be sufficient to cause the demise of marginal operatious•i: Men's,
Youths' & Boys' Footwear of Leather, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 324 aune 1970); Tele•
vision Receivers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 376 (April 1971); Television Receivers,
Radios, & Phonographs, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 380 (April 1971): Women's&: Misses'
Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 323 CTune 1970), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP,
OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971): Women's, Youths', Boys' &: Children's Foot•
wear, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 378 (March 1971).
163. Women's & Misses' Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 323 CTune 1970),
relief granted, 7 WEEKLY Co:MP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971) [hereinafter
Lemar Shoes].
164. Id. at 6-7.
165. Id. at 13.
166. Women's & Misses' Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 361, at 7 CTune 1970),
relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971). In Women's
Leather Shoes, supra note 138, in which Commissioners Clubb and Moore constituted
the majority, Lemar was also cited as controlling. See also Women's, Youths', Boys'
& Children's Footwear, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 378 (March 1971) (2-to-2 vote, one
Commissioner not voting, tie broken by President).
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the firm petitions, there were some cases in which the advocates of
"but for" found themselves in the minority. Typical of these cases was
Phonographs and Radio-Phonograph and Other Combinations.161
The majority, disregarding the Kennedy Round concessions as minor,
denied causation between increased imports and tariff concessions
made two decades earlier. Moreover, increases in imports had begun
prior to the Kennedy Round reductions. The lone dissenter was Commissioner Moore, one of the authors of the "but for" test; he emphasized that the difference between United States and Japanese direct
labor costs in the assembly of a typical radio chassis was less than 25%
of the total trade agreement concessions since 1934 and that the plant
felt compelled to import chassis.168
Second, a specific finding that the restoration of statutory duties
would not be sufficient to make domestic products competitive with
imported ones has led to unanimous denial.169 Significantly, in one·
case the Commission, noting the enormous differences in hourly
wages between the United States and the exporting countries, went
out of its way to state that assembly workers in the major foreign
supplying countries "are efficient in such assembly" and that, therefore, their low hourly earnings "are in great part translated into low
unit labor costs."170 This reasoning underscores the important lesson
that the lower-wage country does not have a competitive advantage
over the higher-wage country solely because of its lower wages;
otherwise the positive American trade balance, which was lost only
recently, would be inexplicable. The low-wage country will be ahead
only if its productivity is equal or nearly equal to that of the highwage country. General findings that unemployment was primarily
due to an employer's inability to meet domestic competition will, of
course, compel unanimous denial. This inability is usually evidenced
by loss of business to United States rivals.171
167. Phonographs &: Radio-Phonograph &: Other Combinations, Tariff Commn.
Puhl. No. 409 Guly 1971). Commissioners Sutton, Leonard, and Young constituted the
majority, Commissioner Moore dissenting. The Chairman did not participate. Commissioner Clubb's term had expired.
168. Id. at 9-11. Accord, Capacitors&: Semiconductors, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 395
(May 1971) (3-to-l vote, Commissioner Moore dissenting and Commissioner Clubb not
participating); Ceramic Floor &: Wall Tile, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 318 (March 1970)
(4-to-2 vote, Commissioners Clubb and Moore dissenting. Commissioner Thunberg,
concurring, noted at 10 that a return to the statutory duty would more than double
the current rates, but would not equal the amount of the price differential between
domestic and imported tile).
169. Toys, Dolls, Models &: Games, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 372 (March 1971).
Stereo 8-Track. Tape Cartridge Playing &: Recording Systems, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No.
349 (Dec. 1970).
170. Toys, Dolls, Models&: Games, supra note 169, at 5.
171. Electrical Conduit &: Fittings, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 424 (Oct. 1971) (total
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Third, petitions have been denied on the grounds that the decline in the domestic economy, crippling strikes, and shutdmvns due
to superannuated equipment, managerial reorganization, shifts in
consumer demands, and rationalization caused the unemployment.172
A number of other cases defy ready characterization. In one
unusual case, a unanimous Commission denied a petition because there was "no correlation •.. between the decline in the rate
of duty resulting from trade agreement concessions and the pattern
of annual imports."178 The statutory rate had been cut in half in 1948
·without affecting imports, which increased only in 1966 and 1967.
The first Kennedy Round reduction of 2% in 1968 resulted in an
enormous increase in imports, but the second phase-a I% reduction
-in 1969 was followed by a drop in imports of more than 50%. In
domestic production increased, while sales of the employer decreased); Carbon Steel
Wire Rod & Wire, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 418 (Aug. 1971) (seventy-year old plant
with fifty-year old equipment); Household Chinaware, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 354
Q'an. 1971) (ninety-year old plant; company unable to cater to prestige market); Rayon
Staple Fiber, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 357 Q'an. 1971) (company's production displaced
by new domestically produced fibers); Glass-Lined Steel Process Equipment, Tariff
Commn. Publ. No. 370 (March 1971); Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No.
402 Q'uly 1971); Women's Leather Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 399 Q'une 1971)
(import competition weak with respect to employer's high-priced shoes); Men's Dress
Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 403 Q'uly 1971) (one of two plants was seventy-one
years old) Women's, Misses', Men's, Youths' & :Boys' Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ,
No. 428 (Oct. 1971) (decline in popularity of company's products); Men's Dress Shoes,
Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 417 (Aug. 1971) (employer's name, assets, and inventory
purchased by Wisconsin firm, which planned to "style-up" products to meet domestic
competition); Women's Vinyl Sandals & Slippers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 448 (Dec.
1971).
172. Women's Leather Sandals, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 404 Q'uly 1971) (prosperous
firm closed plants for reasons "unrelated to the competitive effects of imported footwear''); Footwear Uppers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 429 (Oct. 1971) (reorganization
and relocation of plants by parent company; no showing of increased imports); Bicycle
Tires & Tubes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 325 Q'une 1970) (imports declined in 1969,
cessation of production one of several steps "to eliminate marginal operations''); Elcc•
tronic Receiving Tubes & Transistors, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 396 (May 1971)
(majority rejected "but for" test, and noted that duty free imports contained American
components (see note 158 supra and accompanying te.'Ct); Commissioner Moore, concurring, referred to "soft economic conditions in the U.S." and to a strike of more
than three months duration); Fuel Injection Pumps & Nozzles, Tariff Commn. Publ. No.
390 (April 1971) (closing of plant due to cutbacks of defense expenditures); Cupramonium Continuous Filament Yard, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 384 (April 1971) (no increased imports, substitution of less expensive yarns due to "general adverse economic
conditions'') Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 415 (Aug. 1971) (New
York plant closed because employer refused union's demand to restrict production to
New York State); Unwrought Zinc, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 430 (Nov. 1971) (superannuated equipment, loss to new plants, and domestic cost price squeeze); ·women's
Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 438 (Nov. 1971): Viscose Rayon Yarns Wholly
of Continuous Fibers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 435 (Nov. 1971); Heels for Women's
Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 440 (Nov. 1971); Heels, Soles & Soling Sheets, Tariff
Commn. Publ. No. 441 (Dec. 1971).
173. Can-Sealing Machines & Parts, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 373, at 3 (March 1971).

April 1972]

Hardship Adjustment

819

1970, with another 2% cut in duty, imports more than tripled.174
Presumably, the mysterious zig-zag course of imports, demonstrated
by the spectacular fall in 1969 followed by an even more spectacular
rise, explains this decision.
An even more unusual case was Stainless Steel Wire.175 The only
trade concession was a 2% reduction spread over four years, beginning on January I, 1968, a peak year in the employer's business. In
December 1968, the chairman of the Japan Iron and Steel Exporters'
Association and the associations of steel producers of the European
Coal and Steel Community addressed letters to the United States
Secretary of State announcing that their exports to the United States
in 1969 would not exceed a stated maximum and that in 1970 and
1971 such exports would be confined to limits representing at most
a 5% increase over the preceding year. These commitments were
made on the assumption that total shipments to the United States
from all steel exporting nations would not exceed 14 million net
tons during 1969 and would be limited to 5% increases in each of
the following years, and that the United States would refrain from
imposing increased import duties or quotas. It was also assumed
that these proposals did not violate United States laws.176 These unprecedented undertakings, which have since been followed by comparable understandings relating to textiles,177 were intended to and
174. Id. at 4.
175. Stainless Steel Wire, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 383 (April 1971).
176. 60 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 93, 94 (1969). These communications were forwarded
to the Chairmen of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees. One
may wonder how these private undertakings to limit imports to the United States can
be reconciled with the policy of the antitrust laws. The fact that they were the result
of negotiations encouraged by the Government presumably immunizes the participants
from liability.
177. The Textiles Agreements with Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, and Hong
Kong resulted from long negotiations. See 7 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DocuMENTS 1408 (1971) (Remarks of R.L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the President). The
"Memorandum of Understanding with Japan," typical of the others, states that
Japan will apply restraints to wool and man-made fiber textile exports to the U.S.
for three years beginning Oct. 1, 1971. The base level shall be 950 million square
yards equivalent for all wool and man-made fiber textiles products divided between wool and man-mades as in U.S. imports during the 12 months period ending
March 31, 1971.
Annual growth rates are specified. The textile industry did not file a petition for
escape clause relief, and only five firm petitions and eight workers' petitions were filed
by its members. The contrast with the shoe industry (see text following note 190 infra),
is significant. As to shoes, there were informal discussions with the Italian Government
which resulted in a unilateral order (Protocol No. A/611163, June 26, 1971, Ministry
of Foreign Trade Circular) requiring the chambers of commerce throughout Italy to
make exports of fooavear to the United States subject to the presentation of a foreign
excliange certificate and invoices, accompanied by a visa of the chambers of commerce
to the customs authorities. The chambers were to report monthly on all visas issued.
The document refers to the possibility of import restrictions on shoes by the United
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did forestall Congressional pressure for quotas.178 "Voluntary" commitments by the major exporting countries were deemed preferable
to legislated quotas, which would have been in violation of the GATT
agreement.179 The rigidity and semi-permanency of quotas was discarded in favor of a more flexible arrangement that the parties could
claim was consensual in spite of the fact that it had been obtained by
legislative threats. In short, it was expected that these "voluntary"
restraints would provide sufficient protection for American industries
that clamored for relief.
Ironically, for the Carpenter Technology Corporation, the employer of petitioners, the agreement to limit steel imports had a disasterous effect on its North Brunswick plant. The foreign importers
changed their product mix by shipping to the United States a larger
proportion of their more expensive products such as stainless steel
wire; it was this increase in imports that compelled the closing of the
plant and caused the petitioners' unemployment. A unanimous Commission was thus forced to conclude that the major cause of the increase in imports and of the unemployment was the program of
voluntary restraints rather than tariff concessions.180 Significantly,
Japanese automakers are reported to have engaged in a similar ploy
to get around the surcharge on imports imposed by President Nixon
on August 15, 1971, and revoked on December 20, 1971.181 By emphasizing luxury and sporty cars, which appeal to customers who do not
worry about price, they "limit their very visible unit sales volumes
without a proportionate loss in dollar income."182
The experience of the Carpenter Technology Corporation demonstrates the ingenuity of foreign enterprises in circumventing "voluntary" restrictions of their exports when these restriction are stated
States Government, which would have "grave consequences" for Italy, I am indebted
for this information to Theodore R. Gates, Esq., Assistant Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations, Executive Office of the President.
178. Quotas on steel imports were proposed in S. 2537, 90th Cong., 1st Sess, (1967),
and H.R. 3, 132, 180, 3289 & 3330-32, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). A bill imposing
quotas on shoes and textiles was passed by the House of Representatives in November
1970 (H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2 Sess. (1970)), but was not voted on in the Senate,
Similar bills in the 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (H.R. 20, 442 & 5070 (1971); S. 4 (1971)) and
bills proposing quotas on all imports (S. 2592 & H.R. 10914 (1971)) have not been
acted on. Chairman Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee has stated that
quotas on textiles would not be needed if the United States and Japan could come to
an agreement on limitations of Japanese exports. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1970, at 29, col, 5,
179. See Fulda, Book Review, 69 MICH. L. REv. 783 (1971).
180. Stainless Steel Wire, supra note 175, at 5.
181. Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1971); Proclamation No. 4098, 36
Fed. Reg. 24201 (1971). The surcharge was intended to be a bargaining device to bring
about agreement on new parities for the major currencies.
182. Wall St. J., Nov. II, 1971, at I, col. 6,
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in over-all terms of historical shipments. The President's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy (Williams
Commission) has recommended that "orderly marketing agreements"
be negotiated within GATT "under internationally agreed standards" whenever "imports of particular products cause or threaten
to cause severe domestic adjustment problems in more than one
importing country."183 This procedure would be preferable to the
present United States practice, which relies entirely on political
bargaining induced by pressures from domestic industries.184

VI.

CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE CASE LAW:
THE NEED FOR NEW RUI.ES

The numerous decisions surveyed above, to which new ones are
constantly being added, present a confusing and unsatisfactory picture
that cries out for reform. With respect to procedure, we have already
noted that equal division of the Commission could have been avoided
in numerous cases by a rule requiring participation of all sitting
Commissioners. This requirement would substantially reduce the
opportunity for the President to break tie votes. On the substantive
side reform will be more complicated and ultimately will require
new legislation. The following is an attempt to identify the specific
problems raised by the cases and the present statutes.
A.

The Relationship Between Industry (Escape Clause) Relief and
Individual Adjustments

The Williams Commission Report suggests that the eligibility
requirements for escape clause relief on the one hand and individual
adjustment assistance for firms and workers on the other should not
remain identical but that the former should be more severe than the
latter.185
There are two fairly obvious reasons for this proposed difference
in standards. In the first place, escape clause relief is granted to an
industry in the form of an "increase in, or imposition of, any duty
183. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 64. The Williams Commission referred
to the Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (Feb. 9, 1962, [1962] 3 U.S.T. 2672,
T.I.A.S. No. 6940, extended to Sept. 30, 1973, [1970] 2 U.S.T. 1970, T.I.A.S. No. 6940) as
an example. Article 4 of this agreement allows bilateral arrangements not inconsistent
with the basic objectives of this agreement; under it, the United States has entered 20
such bilaterals.
184. See Metzger, Injury and Market Disruptions from Imports, in papers submitted for WlLLIAMS REPORT (supra note 155) [hereinafter WILLIAMS PAPERS], pt. I, at
167. For the views of specific industries, see Stinson, The Import Problem of the
American Steel Industry, in id., pt. I, at 289; Lynn, The Import Problem of the American Textile and Apparel Industy, in id., pt. I, at 303.
185. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 49-51.
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or other import restriction on the article causing or threatening to
cause serious injury to such industry."186 This action would entitle
other countries affected by such action to withdraw "substantially
equivalent concessions,"187 thereby harming United States exports.
In contrast, individual adjustment assistance to firms or workers has
no international repercussions since it affords relief only to the petitioners. Hence it is logical that escape clause relief should be more
difficult to obtain than individual relief. This conclusion follows
from the commitment of the United States, in its own best interest,
to liberal world trade, which, in spite of steel and textile agreements
and so far unsuccessful proposals for quota legislation, is still the
guiding principle of our foreign economic policy.188 The raising of
trade barriers should, therefore, not be encouraged but used only as
a last resort in emergency situations of wide impact.
The second reason is closely related to the first. Escape clause
relief is intended to be available only when an entire industry is
suffering serious injury. Since it rarely, if ever, happens that every
firm in the industry is adversely affected by imports, there are bound
to be some enterprises that would get a windfall of undeserved protection if tariffs were raised or quotas imposed. Other firms may have
suffered some losses without impairment of their capacity to survive.
Inclividual adjustment assistance, on the other hand, is exclusively
tailored to the need of firms that are in difficulty and of workers who
have lost their jobs. Helping them involves some cost to the tax•
payer, which can be justified on the ground that these firms and
workers are the victims of the national policy of liberalized trade.
The benefits of that policy to consumers and to the national economy,
which is challenged by imports to maintain its competitive drive and
which would be damaged by foreign retaliation to our import restrictions, presumably far outweigh the relatively small expense of public
funds for adjustment assistance. 189 Moreover, the realignment of
currencies achieved by the Agreement of the Group of Ten on
December 18, 1971, is expected to create more favorable conditions
186. 19 U.S.C. § 198l(a){l) (1970).
187. GATT, art. XIX, para. 3.
188. "Let us see to it that as far as trade barrien; are concerned that it is a two-way
street, that markets abroad are open to the United States as we open markets in the
United States to nations abroad." President Nixon, remarks at Associated Milk Pro•
ducers Convocation in Chicago, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1242,
1243 (1971). "Looking to the future, you can be assured of our cooperation in reducing
barrien; of trade, rather than raising them ••••" President Nixon, remarks at White
House Reception for Officials of International Monetary Fund, 7 WEEKLY COMP, OF
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1359, 1360 (1971).
189. See WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 48-49; Metzger, Adjustment Assis•
tance, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 319, 322-23.
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for the United States trade balance and thereby reduce the number
of industries that could invoke the escape clause.190
Finally, the paucity of escape clause cases compared with the
large number of adjustment petitions shows that the adjustment assistance to firms and workers may be granted in many cases in which
there may be no basis for escape clause relief for the industry to
which these firms and workers belong. A particularly dramatic example of this situation is the footwear industry, whose petition for
escape clause relief was unsuccessful, but which accounted for 65%
of all workers' petitions and 40% of all firm petitions decided in
1970 and 1971. Even more significant was the President's recent
action in the Marble and Travertine Products escape clause case noted
above,191 in which he decided that individual adjustment assistance
rather than tariff increases was the appropriate form of relief. This
case demonstrates the wisdom of the present law in giving the President discretion in escape clause cases to provide either for tariff relief
or for adjustment assistance or both.192 The proposal in the pending
bills that would make it mandatory for the President to provide for
adjustment assistance whenever he decides to ignore a Tariff Commission recommendation for industry relief193 is a regrettable curtailment of Presidential discretion.
Our conclusion that escape clause relief should be more sparingly
granted, and require stricter eligibility rules than adjustment assistance, compels a discussion of these rules as they are reflected in the
cases.
B.

The First Causation Requirement: Increased Imports Due in
Major Part to Trade Agreement Concessions

The cases show that the first causation requirement is the major
stumbling block and that the controversy about the proper interpretation of the statute involves the advocates and opponents of the
so-called "but for" test. Since November 1969 these advocates, consistently backed by the President's tie breaking vote, have prevailed
in a number of cases. However, there are inconsistent holdings and
the question cannot be regarded as definitely settled.
The nub of the problem is the significance of the time interval
between the granting of concessions and the increases in imports.
190. BNA, International Trade Reporter's Survey and Analysis of Current Develop·
ments, Dec. 24, 1971.
191. See text accompanying notes 90-96 supra.
192. 19 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (1970).
193. S. 4, § 112 &: H.R. 20, § 112, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), proposed amendments
to § 302(a)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (1970).
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Everyone agrees, of course, that if that interval is short, causation "in
major part" must be presumed. This agreement extends to cases in
which small concessions granted by the Kennedy Round were followed by increased imports even though there had been large concessions years earlier. The difficulty arises when years or even decades
have elapsed between the last concessions and the rise in imports or
when recent concessions were so small that, in the absence of special
circumstances, they cannot be assumed to have had any effect on
imports. In such situations, "but for" means that causation "in
major part" is present if the competitive advantage of the imports
could have been prevented by maintenance of the 1930 SmootHawley tariff. In other words, "but for" wipes out four decades of
turbulent American history.
The hard facts of recent events do not support such a fanciful
theory. All the cases deal with developments during the second half
0£ the 1960's, which witnessed the "virtual doubling of U.S. Merchandise imports." 194 In some industries the surge was even greater.
Specifically, "imports rose by nearly $7 billion between 1967 and
1968, an increase of 23%," 195 This was a period of "severe overheating in the U.S. economy." 196 Indeed, the federal deficit in 1968
amounted to $25.2 billion, which was three times as high as in
1967.197 Outlays for national defense (mainly the Vietnam war)
amounted to 45% of the federal budget in 1968, and to more than
40% in 1965 through 1967 and in 1969 and 1970.188 These inflationary developments could not help but intensify upward pressures on
domestic prices and wages199 with detrimental effects on exports and
encouragement for imports.
The repercussions of these pressures have been unfortunate.
American wage rates have always been higher than those of other
countries. Yet in this century they have been offset by the higher
productivity of the American worker, as demonstrated by the consistent excess of our exports over imports. This positive trade balance
reaqied an all-time high during the first half of the 1960's when it
194. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 45.
195. Kravis, The Current Case for Import Limitations, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra
note 184, pt. I, at 141, 143. During the same period exports increased by $3 billion,
196. Houthakker, The U.S. Balance of Payments-A. Look A.head, in W1LLIA111s
PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 31, 33.
197. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL .ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES! 1971,
at 373.
198. Id. at 373.

199. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Comparative International Labor Cost and Pro•
ductivity, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 535, 536. See also Abegglen,
Dynamics of Japanese Competition, in id., pt. II, at 153, 156 ("U.S. inflation levels , , ,
have played havoc with U.S. competitiveness.').
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averaged $6.3 billion.200 But from 1966 to 1970 this average dropped
to $3.7 billion201 and in 1971 the balance showed a deficit for the
first time.202
This development is confirmed by data showing the relationship
between wage increases and productivity. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics reports that during the first half of the decade "increases in
hourly compensation in the U.S. were more than offset by larger increases in productivity, resulting in a decline in unit labor costs,
while the generally larger productivity increases in Japan and Europe
were not sufficient to offset the even more substantial increases in
hourly compensation."203 But in the second half of the decade, when
inflation and the "guns and butter" program to finance the Vietnam
War by deficit spending reached their peak, things began to turn
sour: Based on a 1966 index of 100, United States unit labor costs
reached 113 in 1969, compared to 102 in Japan and France, 101 in
Germany, and 107 in Italy and the United Kingdom.204 During that
same period, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
average hourly compensation in U.S. manufacturing rose at a 5.8
per cent rate; however, the productivity gain was only at a rate of
2.1 per cent.... Hence, the rise of unit labor costs.... Productivity in
European countries grew at annual rates of 4 per cent or more from
1965 to 1969 and the rate of increase in Japan amounted to 15 per
cent, in contrast to the U.S. 2.1 per cent rate. 205
These over-all figures indicate that, with respect to industries subject
to heavy import competition-those which are involved in the Tariff
Commission cases--United States competitiveness has been seriously
200. STATI511CAL .ABSTRACT, supra note 197, at 766.
201. Id.
202. The temporary surcharge on imports (see text accompanying note 181 supra)
was imposed by the United States to safeguard its balance of payments and on the
ground that a trade deficit of $2 billion was forecast for 1971. See GATT Press Release of Aug. 26, 1971; Statement by the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Economic
Affairs, N. Sammuels, at GATT Council Meeting, Aug. 24, 1971, released by U.S.
Information Service.
203. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 199, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184,
pt. I, at 537.
204. Houthakker, supra note 196, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 36, 38.
205. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 199, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184,
pt. I, at 537. Taking 1967 as the base of 100, increases in the three succeeding years were
as follows: Total output per man hour: 102.9, 103.7, and 104.6; compensation per
man hour: 107.6, 115.4, and 123.6; total unit labor cost: 104.6, 111.3, and 118.2.
STATI511CAL .ABsrRACT, supra note 197, at 224. For data on specific import-competing
industries whose productivity growth lagged, see Bureau of Labor Statistics, Productivity and Unit Labor Costs in Export and Import-Competing Industries, 1958-1968,
in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 507, 515-16. See generally Bureau of Labor
Statistics, The Meaning and Measurement of Productivity and Improving Productivity:
Labor and Management Approaches, BULL, No. 1715 (Sept. 1971).
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weakened by causes other than trade agreement concessions.200 The
general assumption of the "but for" test, that tariff concessions since
1934 have been the major cause of increased imports, thus appears
to be untenable. Indeed, the cases that applied the "but for" test by
and large confirm the conclusion of Professor Kravis that tariff concessions did not play a major role in the increase in imports. Neither
the reductions made in 1956 nor those in 1961 and 1962 had had a
major impact on the increases in imports in the latter part of the
1960's that coincided with the Kennedy Round and in many cases
produced cuts in tariffs "that can hardly have amounted to an average
reduction in price to U.S. buyers of as much as 1 per cent."207
It follows then that the major cause for the doubling of imports
during the latter part of the 1960's appears to have been American
inflation with its unfortunate consequence of crucial losses in the
high efficiency that prevailed until the middle of the decade. 208 It
is to be hoped that the end of the war, the program to limit the
domestic inflation, and a realignment of the major exchange rates
will rekindle the competitive spirit.200 The conclusion is inescapable
that the "but for" test as applied to determine the connection of increased imports and trade concessions is a misinterpretation of the
1962 statute.
This leads us to the question of how that statute should be
changed. The Williams Commission has recommended that applicants for both escape clause relief and adjustment assistance should
not be required to show a connection between increased imports and
a previous reduction of duties resulting from a trade agreement con•
cession.210 The three bills introduced in the House of Representatives
206. The Bureau of Labor Statistics concedes, of course, that there are United States
industries with no significant import competition. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra
note 199, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 539.
207. Kravis, supra note 195, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 149.
Professor Kravis suggests that tariff changes have had relatively small effects on United
States prices of imported goods and have brought about equal advantages for United
States exporters. In some cases, because of the peculiar nature of the commodities in•
volved, it has been found that very small tariff reductions would lead to greater im•
ports. Id. at 163. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
208. It has been suggested that "a relatively better cost and price performance is
only a partial help towards a better competitive performance •••• Particularly in the
consumer goods sector, U.S. firms may have to increase their flexibility and responsive•
ness to changes in demand, here and abroad ••••" Solomon, Trade, Investment and
the Balance of Payments Adjustment Process, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I,
at 71, 79.
209. President Nixon stated that his economic program was "designed to nurture
and stimulate that competitive spirit; to help us snap out of the self-doubt, the self•
disparagement that saps our energy and erodes our confidence in ourselves." Address
to the Nation, Aug. 15, 1971, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREsroENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1172 (1971).
210. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 51.

April 1972]

Hardship Adjustment

827

early in the Ninety-second Congress would carry out this recommendation.211 On the other hand, the Senate bill introduced in
January 1971 by twelve Senators of both parties would retain the first
causation requirement in modified form for escape clause actions
while abolishing it for adjustment assistance. 212 The latter bill requires the Tariff Commission, in escape clause cases, to determine
"whether an article upon which a concession has been granted under
a trade agreement is, as a result, in whole or in part, of the duty or
other customs treatment reflecting such concession, being imported
... in such increased quantities ..•." 218
Thus the Senate bill points in the right direction by intending to
make the standards for escape clause relief tougher than the eligibility requirements for individual adjustment assistance. But the
language used for that purpose is questionable. The proposed standard-that an industry applying for import restrictions has to show
only that the increased imports were "in part" due to trade agreement concessions-would go even further than the "but for" test
by permitting industry relief on the basis of a finding that trade concessions, however insignificant or ancient, contributed ever so slightly
to the increase in imports. This standard would make the first causation requirement meaningless and thereby practically restore the
equality of treatment of escape clause and individual adjustments.
Indeed, the desirability of maintaining the present language of the
first causation requirement is illustrated by the Commission's recent
five-to-one decision in Television Receivers and Certain Parts Thereof,214 in which escape clause relief was denied because the increase
in imports was attributed, "in major part," to dumping rather than
concessions. If the dissent had prevailed, the industry might have obtained both antidumping duties and a tariff increase. Perhaps the
inconsistencies in the cases could be eliminated by addition of the
following proviso: "Increased imports shall be presumed, subject to
rebuttal evidence presented by petitioners, to have been caused by
factors other than trade agreement concessions if three years or more
211. H.R. 20, 442 &: 5070, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The three bills also contain the
mandatory relief provisions for escape clause cases which were contained in the 1970
bill and were convincingly criticized by Professor Metzger, supra note 6, at 375-76. As of
December 1971, no action had been taken on these bills.
212. S. 4, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). No action has been taken to date. See Comment,
The Trade Act of 1971: A Fundamental Change in U.S. Foreign Trade Policy, 80 YALE
L.J. 1418 (1971).
213. S. 4, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1971). H.R. 10192 and H.R. 10252, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971), introduced by Congressman Betts and nine other House Members,
use the same language.
214. Television Receivers & Certain Parts Thereof, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 436
(Nov. 1971).
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have elapsed between the granting of the concessions and the increased imports."
As explained above, most reform proposals would eliminate the
first causation requirement for adjustment assistance to firms and
workers; 215 this change is clearly desirable. The individual adjustment mechanism to hardship caused by imports need not be restricted
to concession-generated imports. Such a restriction would limit the
effectiveness of individual adjustment assistance as a safety valve
against protectionist pressures and as a measure of relief to individual
hardship caused by the free-trade regime of the GATT.
C.

The Second Causation Requirement: Increased Imports Must
Be the Major Factor in Causing, or Threatening to Cause,
Serious Injury

As to the second causation requirement, the Williams Commission recommended no change in the existing language for escape
clause relief, but it suggested that adjustment assistance should be
available whenever "an increase in imports contributes substantially
to causing ... serious injury.''216 The four bills introduced at the
beginning of the Ninety-second Congress would not differentiate
between escape clause relief and adjustment assistance. Using identical language, they would require that the increased imports "contribute substantially toward causing or threatening to cause serious
injury to the domestic industry producing articles like or directly
competitive with the imported article.'' 217 Two subsequent House
bills, omitting any qualifying words, simply refer to increased imports that cause serious injury.21s
These proposals are less convincing than those directed at the
first causation requirement. The cases demonstrate that the second
causation requirement does not present difficulties comparable to
those inherent in the first. By and large, the Commission has done a
creditable job in determining when increased imports have or have
not been the major cause of serious injury or threat of such injury.
For instance, as we have seen, in numerous denials the Commission
convincingly explained that the injury or unemployment was due to
inability to compete ·with domestic rivals, corporate reorganization,
215. H.R. 10192 (§ 301) and H.R. 10252 (§ 301), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), would
keep the first causation requirement for adjustment assistance to firms and workers,
with "in whole or in part" substituted for "in major part."
216. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 51.
217. S. 4 (§ 111), H.R. 20 (§ 111), H.R. 442 (§ lll), H.R. 5070 (§ 111), 92d Cong,,
1st Sess. (1971).
218. H.R. 10192 (§ 301), H.R. 10252 (§ 301), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). These bills
make no distinction between escape clause relief and adjustment assistance.
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recession, inflation, and other causes. There is, of course, always
room for disagreement when the relative importance of a variety of
complex factors must be weighed. But this difficulty could not be
eliminated by any new legislative formula.
Last, but not least, the merits of the second causation requirement,
as expressed in the present statutory language, are considerably
stronger than those of the first. The philosophy of adjustment assistance is to relieve individual suffering caused by imports. To extend
this relief to industries, firms, and workers to whose injury or unemployment increased imports have made only a minor contribution
would be to turn the adjustment machinery into government insurance for inefficiency or for misfortunes only remotely connected with
imports. This result would be fatal to the urgent national goal of
revitalizing the competitive drive without which even seemingly
advantageous currency realignments would be to no avail. Hence
the existing law relating to the second causation requirement should
remain as it is.
D.

The Substantive Benefits of Adjustment Assistance

The substantive statutory benefits for firms and workers declared
eligible for adjustment assistance have been explained elsewhere
and need not be repeated here. 219 Although some firms and workers
have received substantial help, there has been much criticism of
the existing law and its administration. One important reason for
complaint is delay. For instance, in December 1971 the Tariff Commission unanimously held that the former workers of the Utica
Cutlery Company were entitled to receive adjustment assistance. 220
The firm itself had been declared eligible for adjustment assistance
four months earlier221 but at the time the workers' petition was
decided the firm's proposal to the Department of Commerce was
still "under consideration."222 Apparently this is not a unique case.223
The Williams Commission noted that "aid to workers becomes
219. See Bureau of Domestic Commerce, Adjustment Assistance for U.S. Firms, in
W1LLIA11rs PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 367; Department of Labor, Adjustment
Assistance for Workers, in id. at 383; Metzger, supra note 6, at 389-97.
220. Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 442 (Dec. 1971).
221. Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 414 (Aug. 1971).
222. Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, supra note 220, at 2.
223. See Pierson, Promises, Promises. Firms Hurt by Imports, Assured of Help in
1962, Find It Tough To Get, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1971, at 1, col. 6. The author refers to a
New York executive as saying that every time he sends Commerce Department officials
some figures to prove that his company has been injured, "they ask for more figures." Id.
at 16, col. 4. This had been going on for half a year. As to difficulties encountered by
firms, see WILLIAMS REPoRT, supra note 155, at 56-57; Fooks, Trade Adjustment Assistance, in WILLIA?lrs PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 343, 352-53.

830

Michigan Law Review

available long after the date on which actual layoffs have occurred
and on which the process of relocation and training should have
begun."224 Specifically, the time elapsed between certification and
the start of benefits averaged sixteen months.22 1l Hence workers
frequently do not begin to receive assistance until many weeks after
they have lost their jobs. Since workers' allowances are limited in
time, a large part will be paid retroactively; these payments will have
to be used to liquidate debts incurred since unemployment began,
thus making much of the adjustment allowance unavailable for subsistence during the retraining period.226
On the substantive side, the Williams Commission recommended
wider benefits for workers, relaxation of the requirement concerning
previous work and earnings, opportunities for technical and professional (in addition to vocational) training, family health benefits,
and protection of pension rights.227 For firms, the Commission urged
more attractive terms of financial assistance at_ lower interest rates,
tax benefits, and interim financing between approval and delivery
of assistance. It indicated that such benefits should "normally be
available only to small businesses."228
These recommendations deserve serious consideration by Congress, which in any event should set time limits ensuring speedy
consideration and action. However, the additional recommendation
to transfer eligibility determination from the Tariff Commission to
the Executive Branch229 should be rejected: It is essential that such
determinations continue to be made by an independent agency that
is less directly subject to political pressure than the Executive. Indeed, it cannot be repeated often enough that adjustment assistance
to firms and workers should not degenerate into a general subsidy
program. Adjustment assistance can serve the national interest only
as a device to rehabilitate small businesses and workers-helpless
victims of the nation's liberal trade policy-to the end that they may
resume their places in the economy. And that inflation-ridden economy can be revitalized only by the competitive drive toward greater
productive efficiency.
224. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 53.
225. Fooks, supra note 223, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 350.
226. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 54.
227. Id. at 56.
228. Id. at 58. See also Metzger, supra note 6, at 397-400. The Department of Com•
merce has proposed to revise its regulations to provide for more accelerated procedures,
See 37 Fed. Reg. 3726 (1972).
229. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 54.

